"Diminishing return on additional debt"

Zarathustra, Dienstag, 07.10.2014, 20:37 (vor 4105 Tagen) @ Ashitaka

Es geht nicht darum, dass ein Kreditnehmer leistet, sondern es geht immer
nur darum, dass der Leistende einen positiven Cash Flow generiert, der
sowohl die Zins- und Tilgungsdienste deckt, als auch den gewünschten
Überschuss. Sonst würde ich gleich nur auf Eigenleistung setzen!

Ich sehe es, wie gesagt, so, dass der Input an Krediten immer wenige
belastbares Eigentum als Output erzeugt und der Debitismus am Ende

(u.a.)

daran scheitert.

Das muss ich überlesen haben.

Ja, das ist schon so. Unerbittlich abnehmender Grenznutzen sowohl bei zusätzlichen Schulden (Melchior Paly) wie auch bei zusätzlicher Investition in zusätzliche Komplexität (Tainter).

Melchior Palyi’s early warning

In the 1950’s when the dollar was still redeemable in the sense that foreign governments and central banks could convert their short-term dollar balances into gold at the fixed statutory rate of $35 per ounce, the marginal productivity of debt was 3 or higher, meaning that the addition of $1 in new debt caused the GDP to increase by at least $3. By August, 1971, when Nixon defaulted on the international gold obligations of the United States (following in the footsteps of F.D. Roosevelt who had defaulted on its domestic gold obligations 35 years earlier) the marginal productivity of debt has fallen below the crucial level 1. When marginal productivity fell below $1 but was still positive, it meant that total debt (always ‘net’) was rising faster than GDP. For example, if the marginal productivity of debt was ½, then $2 in debt had to be incurred in order to increase the nation’s output of goods and services by $1. An increase in total debt by $1 could no longer reproduce its cost in the form of an equivalent increase in the GDP. Debt lost whatever economic justification it may have once had.

The decline in the marginal productivity of debt has continued without interruption thereafter. Nobody took action, in fact, the Keynesian managers of the monetary system and the economy stone-walled this information, keeping the public in the dark. Nor did Keynesian and Friedmanite economists at the universities pay attention to the danger sign. Cheerleaders kept chanting: “Gimme more credit!”

Grüsse, Zara